by Unknown | 10/31/2007 12:27:00 AM
Starting tomorrow, Cliopatria will throw open the floor for nominations for the Cliopatria Awards, the most prestigious awards in the history blogosphere. The Awards encompass all history blogging from December 1, 2006 through November 30, 2007, and grant mention only to content that is chiefly historical, not political, in nature. Awards will be presented at the Cliopatria Banquet at the American Historical Association Conference in Washington, DC in January. As I did last year, I will be making a series of nominations in the six categories: Best Individual Blog, Best Group Blog, Best New Blog, Best Post, Best Series of Posts, and Best Writer.

My nominations don't mean any more than anyone else's, and you're welcome to nominate anything you want if I didn't mention it. (Nominations require both a name and a link to the post or series of posts. If you have a specific ProgressiveHistorians post in mind, first check to see whether I've put it up here, then ask me and I'll try to resurrect it from the archive.) Also, unlike last year, I'll be nominating several non-PH bloggers in addition to my PH nominations, and also cutting down on the total number of nominations entirely (only one from me per category, except I'm nominating three pieces for Best Post). However, given my capacity as editor of ProgressiveHistorians, I thought I'd share an expanded version of my nominations here, complete with "honorable mentions" that won't actually be nominated (by me) for the Awards. Consider this my own personal list of ProgressiveHistorians Awards, in which inclusion, given the large volume of posts here over the past year (nearly 2,000), is itself an honor.

If you've got any posts you'd like to add to this discussion, feel free to mention them in comments (or to nominate them at Cliopatria), whether they're from this site or from somewhere else.



Best Individual Blog: Lisa Pease's Real History Blog. While I often disagree with her conclusions, Pease's research (focusing on theories of 1960's assassinations) is always incredibly exhaustive. She's that rare conspiracy theorist whose impeccable reasoning makes you constantly reevaluate your own scholarship.

Honorable Mention: Rachel Leow's A Historian's Craft; Zenpundit's eponymous blog; Ralph Brauer's The Strange Death of Liberal America; Kevin Levin's Civil War Memory; Dave Praeger's Poop the Book.

Best Group Blog: ProgressiveHistorians, of course! (Classic posts here; complete post archive here.)

Best New Blog: I'm proud to nominate Rachel Leow's A Historian's Craft, a vibrant and erudite voice that has burst onto the blogging scene. Rachel's willingness to tackle esoteric subjects with verve and insight, as well as her unforgettable "Bookporn" series, make this a must-read for all history bloggers.

Honorable mention: Paul Harvey et al's Religion in American History; our own PhDinHistory's eponymous blog.

Best Writing: In my view, David Kaiser is the best writer in the history blogosphere today, bar none. This was an easy choice.

Honorable mention: Unitary Moonbat at ProgressiveHistorians (link is to his Daily Kos page, which contains much the same content); Ralph Brauer at ProgressiveHistorians and The Strange Death of Liberal America; Rick Shenkman at POTUS.

Best Post: Three nominees in this category: Eugene, Whither -- or Whether -- Wikipedia?, a rumination on Wikipedia's role in the classroom drawing on themes from the late Roy Rosenzweig; midtowng, Into the Unknown Heart of America, an excellent retelling of Cabeza de Vaca's Western expedition; pico, Nous Sommes Tous Americains, and The Death of Irony, a skillful application of textual analysis to two post-9/11 public documents; all from ProgressiveHistorians.

Honorable Mention: James Livingston, Lincoln the Revolutionary; Yetimonk, A Jigsaw of School Shootings; Ralph Brauer, Harry Truman: The Welfare of the Whole People Should Come First and Bryan, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan (from The Strange Death of Liberal American); all, unless otherwise noted, from ProgressiveHistorians.

Best Series of Posts: With due respect to the several fantastic series that have been posted here this year, the runaway nominee in this category is Gordon Taylor's The Pasha and the Gypsy (2 3 4 5 6). Through a careful reinterpretation of sections of Zsa Zsa Gabor's two autobiographies, Taylor brings to life the vanished world of late Kemalist Turkey through the 15-year-old Gabor's eyes. Taken as a whole, these six essays constitute probably one of the two or three most powerful things I've ever read online in nearly five years of blogging. Every year there's one nomination in a Cliopatria category that I feel particularly strongly about; this is it for 2007. If I had one wish, it would be that Gordon would stop blogging and become a full-time paid essayist -- his stuff's that good, and believe me, I've seen a lot.

Honorable mention: Series by midtowng (Kurdistan), Ralph Brauer (Presidential rhetoric), Bastoche (the ongoing History and the Kagans), and Unitary Moonbat (several different series), all available in whole or in part here. Our folks are good at series!

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by Gordon Taylor | 10/30/2007 11:46:00 PM


These days the online papers seem to be full of news about the PKK. It's as if the editors are saying, "Hey, send somebody up there and get a story." You can find a good sampling of the latest at Mizgin's blog, including one from the L.A. Times and another from the Sunday Times of London. The latter brings us the news that, lo and behold, there are several Britons in the ranks of the PKK army. The L.A. Times article informs us that, yes indeed, they are scattered across an extremely remote and inaccessible area. Mizgin has these and the translation of a statement by Murat Karayilan of the PKK on the condition of the 8 captured Turkish soldiers. (They're fine, he says. Basically, the PKK just wants to get rid of them; unfortunately the Turks keep shelling the mountains and keeping his men from getting them out. But then, the Turkish Army hasn't even admitted yet that the men are prisoners.) Meanwhile, in Istanbul, the pro-Kurdish newspaper Ozgur Gundem keeps getting knocked out of cyberspace by the Turkish authorities. Their sin: publishing news that people want to read about. It happens all the time.

I'm going to publish some more photos from the PKK website, but first I want readers to remember the obvious: if you're the parent of a Turkish soldier who has been drafted, sent to the East, and killed in a firefight with the PKK, you have good reason not to like these people. War is hell, on both sides, and both sides have endured their share of grief. Pretty pictures should not blind us to that reality. As for the PKK themselves, we'll have plenty of pictures to show later.



Actually, the photograph above was not taken by the PKK. I took it in May 1977. It shows the village of Kespiyanish, inhabited by Kurds and now branded by Turkish bureaucrats as Mutluca, or the happy little place. Kespiyanish used to be inhabited by Nestorian Christians. They were driven out during the First World War. The church they built still stands, a testament to the skill they put into the stonework. All mountain churches are entered through a porthole-like opening, requiring the visitor to step over a knee-high threshold and duck his head. This has effectively kept the Kurds from making any use of the structure. The Kurds of Kespiyanish were convinced that the Christians had buried gold on the premises, and nothing I said could dissuade them from this. Actually, the gold is elsewhere:

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This is where their gold really lay: in the Nestorians' terracing systems, intricately laid out and arduously maintained. Here they grew everything they needed. This is a PKK photo. I can't say for certain that it depicts a deserted Nestorian village. There are, after all, plenty of deserted Kurdish villages in the mountains. And travelers' accounts make it clear that, depending on which district they found themselves in, the Kurds too excelled in this type of agriculture. But travelers in the district of Hakkari (now in Turkey) point out that in one particular tribal area (Tiyari) the Christians were so feared, and held in such dread by the Kurds, that they felt secure enough to keep their houses spread out and close to their fields. Usually, it is otherwise: mountain village houses are always bunched together, stacked one on top of another, as a means of gaining security. More like this:

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Again, I have no idea where this village is, but it's probably in Turkey. Note the sharpness of those right angles in the stonework. Again, it's a feature that varies from district to district. I've seen Kurdish stone dwellings in Mardin that were superb; elsewhere, the walls are stacks of rough stone mortared together with mud, then roofed over with branches and more mud on top of that.

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This is more like it. This gives us a feeling of the immensity of it all, of a place where you can stand upon snow and look off onto the plains of Mesopotamia, and temperatures well over 100 degrees. It's the guerrillas' world, and here is their rations:

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This is the classic peasant meal in Turkey: a beaten shield of metal, a fire, and the simplest bread possible. Bun and Run. But there are a few compensations:

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On April 26, 1849, Justin Perkins, an American missionary from Amherst, Massachusetts, wrote in his journal from the Kurdish mountains: "Another villager brought us the finest flower I ever beheld, which he had picked, in its wildness, on the neighboring mountains." He then went on to describe the flower shown above. In gardening circles it is called the Crown Imperial fritillaria, and it grows (from a bulb) to a height of 3-4 feet. In Turkish it is called the "ters lale," or "inside-out tulip," and it is a protected species in the mountains of Hakkari province. The PKK women like them, too, as this photo shows:

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And what would a survey of the flora be without this?

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These are, please take note, the real deal: genuine wild tulips blooming in the place where the species originated. In a way, the tulipomania of Holland (its genes, at least) can be traced back to here.

But it's scenes like the following that we need to think of when the war comes:

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Hidden torrents; brush-covered canyons; waterfalls:

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With only occasional aids to navigation:

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Next time, I believe, it's time to start looking at people:

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That, as we'll see, will contain some big surprises.

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by Winter Rabbit | 10/30/2007 05:30:00 PM


Herstories on the issue of violence against women

A Cheyenne proverb states, "A nation is not conquered until the hearts of its women are on the ground. Then it is done, no matter how brave its warriors or how strong its weapons." Our hearts are not on the ground. Our feet are. And we are moving forward.


A travesty to the true spirit of justice is taking place on the Standing Rock Reservation that covers North and South Dakota. Predominantly white male rapists are sexually assaulting American Indian women and getting away with inadequate consequences or no consequences whatsoever.



Crossposted at Native American Netroots

Show me a rapist of an American Indian woman and I'll show you an upstanding member of society. That's what the Major said about a man who plead guilty to raping an American Indian woman. Maybe the thieves and vandals who have caused property damage so severe that Pretty Bird Woman House had to close its doors for now are "upstanding citizens" as well.


Thieves have stolen food and a television set from Pretty Bird Woman House. The very walls were smashed through to break inside or destroy it; then, it was set on fire.

(Not Pretty Bird Woman House)

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What if this occurred in a Caucasian controlled city or county? Allow me to share a story from my personal experience.

I left a gig with horn and stand in hand; I was walking to the parking garage. I witnessed a couple fighting when I got to the elevator. "A little unusual, but none of my business," I thought. However, next the man called his girlfriend a slut and slammed her up against the wall. It became my business. While three others were standing around, wondering if they should call 911, I said "Stop" firmly to him. Ignoring me, he became more violent; so, I commanded her to get out of the elevator.  One of the others was calling 911 at that point. She did not get out of the elevator, "My keys are in his truck." He lowered his head and pushed his hand towards me for me to back off; he couldn't look me in the eye. I told her to get out again. The doors closed.


I told the others with cell phones to follow me up the stairs and to be calling 911. They bailed. I went to the second floor and waited. Nothing. I didn't know which floor they went to, "Battered wife syndrome" I thought as I went down the stairs and found a police officer on the street. I told him what happened and he went into the parking garage to investigate. That is the difference between what happens on the Standing Rock Reservation and a Caucasian controlled city or county - justice.



Source

In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled in Oliphant v. the Suquamish Indian Tribe that tribal governments have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. When a crime is committed, tribal police and their non-Indian counterparts must hash out whether the suspect is Indian or not.


I have two primary reasons why I did what I did. The first one is that violence against women doesn't happen in front of me; I won't allow it. The second one is that that woman, whatever her name, is my cousin. She is my relative.


Here is a CHIPIN CAMPAIGN from PiledHigherandDeeper, who asked me to do this here.


Please make a donation at the CHIPIN CAMPAIGN for the Pretty Bird Woman House to help keep the hearts of the women off the ground.




Source

"I prefer to characterize rape simply as a form of torture.  Like the torturer, the rapist is motivated by the urge to dominate, humiliate, and destroy his victim.  Like a torturer, he does so by using the most intimate acts available to humans -- sexual ones."

Helen Benedict, Virgin or Vamp, 1992


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by Unknown | 10/28/2007 04:07:00 PM
Josh Trevino is the vice president of a conservative think tank and the co-founder of Redstate (with which he is no longer affiliated). Despite these facts, I've always found Josh to be exceptionally thoughtful, well-spoken, and full of fresh ideas -- an individual, in short, for whom I have great respect.

In July, Josh posted an essay titled Turks and Tolerance (originally published in the National Review Online), which I reviewed in a (now-deleted) Open Thread at ProgressiveHistorians. While my comment was mostly favorable, I criticized Josh for his comment that "we should have enough experience with political Islam by now to regard it with wary skepticism until given reason to trust." Josh e-mailed me for a clarification of my views, and the result was a fascinating e-mail discussion that lasted over a month and touched on a wide-ranging variety of topics.

Josh has asked that I repost our correspondence here, and I do so now in the format of a conversation between the two of us, with light edits. I think it's a wonderful example of how two people from two differing political traditions can have a respectful, enjoyable, and enlightening discussion about political issues.



Josh Trevino: Do you believe that we don't have enough experience with political Islam to render judgment; or that our experience with political Islam is that this judgment is unjustified?

Jeremy Young: I don't believe it's political Islam that's necessarily at fault in many Middle Eastern countries, but the dictatorial governments that are in place prior to political Islam's ascendancy. We see the provocation for such governments in examples both new and old: in the Shah of Iran, and in today's Musharraf and Mubarak, among others. Treating political Islam as a monolith of evil results in the same sort of strategic miscalculations the U.S. committed during the Cold War: backing an ineffective leader like Mubarak who does not have the support of his own people is no better than funneling money to the Contras just because they were not Communist.

You acknowledged this in your original piece by inferring that political Islam in Turkey is better than Kemalist nationalism. I'm simply taking the next step and suggesting that we have no need to stereotype political Islam as being negative at all, despite specific examples such as Khomeini and the Taliban. Rather than viewing it with skepticism, I believe, political Islam should be viewed just like any other government, on a case-by-case basis based on its commitment to the betterment of its people.

Josh Trevino: Your point is well taken, although I differ from your assessment on two points:

First, political Islam is as proactive as reactive, and so its faults are not wholly, nor even mostly, the responsibility of its predecessors or enemies. The crimes of Hamas or the Iranian regime, for example, are not meaningfully the faults of the Israelis or the Shah. We should credit Islamists with the independent volition and sophistication that they undeniably possess.

Second, I am not sure that a "commitment to the betterment of its people" is a useful metric for the assessment of a government. Particularly where theocratic impulses are concerned, that commitment is undeniably strong -- by the lights of those impulses, anyway. The Saudis, for example, are extremely concerned with promoting that betterment -- by beheading, if necessary.

Bottom line is that the relevant metric is probably concurrence with our own stated values -- and the plain data of experience.

Jeremy Young: Regarding your first point, I suppose what I'm trying to say is that political Islam often doesn't become unduly restrictive unless it's brought in to replace an unpopular dictatorial government. It's the more virulent strains of political Islam that can most easily withstand political unrest or dictatorship; think of Moqtada al-Sadr maintaining an effective militia while the more moderate Sistani sat on his duff under house arrest by Saddam, or the increasing radicalization of political Islam in Chechnya as the more moderate elements are literally blown up. As a general rule, Muslims would prefer to see more reasonable leaders, rather than radical Islamists, overthrow their dictatorships; we saw that when the Iranians turned first to Mossadegh before moving reluctantly toward Khomeini. (The exceptions are in Palestine and southern Lebanon, where many Muslims view the moderates as ineffectual, and Afghanistan, which is a natural warlord state where the radicals managed to secure enough money to build a superior army to their neighbors' and then set about conquering everybody in sight.) So if we want to promote moderate political Islam, we should start by no longer propping up unpopular dictators, and then see if we can't make common cause with the moderate Islamists --something the Clinton administration did admirably in Iran, for instance.

As for your second point, it's an excellent one; when I said "the betterment of their people," I was thinking of Hugo Chavez, who has undeniably raised the standard of living for his people, but is opposed anyway by the United States for his geopolitical antics. (I personally consider him a buffoon, not to be taken seriously on the international stage, but would advocate a rapprochement with his government on the grounds that he has helped his people and remains popular at home.)

Josh Trevino: I suppose I'm not convinced that "moderate Islamists" really exist as a meaningful subset of Islamists in general. The only example that I can think of whom we could morally approve of (as opposed to live with in a realpolitik sense) may be the AK party in Turkey. Elsewhere, even the Iranian "moderates" whom you cite are still enthusiastic proponents of annihilating Israel; and any Islamic polity, by definition, will impose some manner of Islamic law, which is ultimately incompatible with our ideas of (classically) liberal democracy. Admittedly this may range from the horrors of the Taliban to the comparative liberality of the present Indonesian regime; but the fundamental contradiction always remains.

Agreed of course that autocrats are a poor investment on pragmatic and moral grounds -- but it does not follow from this that their alternatives are inherently better.

Jeremy Young: I think Mostafa Moeen could be realistically considered a moderate Islamist -- and I don't believe he wants to annihilate Israel, though I couldn't find his position online one way or the other (I don't read Persian, so I couldn't check out his blog).

And I'm not saying we should necessarily invest in Islamic regimes -- but neither do I think we have the right to dismiss them because they don't believe in classically liberal democracy. To me, the fundamental principle of democracy (not political democracy, but theoretical democracy) is the right of the people to choose whatever government they want, be that democratic, Communist, monarchist (as the Afghanis would surely have chosen had their king consented to return permanently), or Islamist. If the U.S. wants to support alternatives financially as we did in Serbia, I'm all for it; but we should also recognize the will of the people when it goes against us.

Josh Trevino: I think we're getting to the rub here, which is not so much about Islamism as it is differing valuations of classical liberalism and democracy. You appear to value the latter over the former, and I hold the opposite valuation. Am I misunderstanding you?

Jeremy Young: No, I think you've got it just about right, with the caveat that I'm talking about the idea of democracy rather than a specific governmental system. i.e., I think the U.S. should treat Hugo Chavez as a full partner because he's democratically elected and enjoys the authentic support of his people (even though I personally think he's a pompous windbag and a joke), while you, I take it, think we should continue to fund protests against him because he opposes a classically liberal government. Correct?

Josh Trevino: Leaving aside Chavez specifically, you're correct. I see democracy as a morally-neutral mechanism, rather then a prerequisite for just governance. In this, I agree with the Declaration of Independence: "[T]o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." The primary purpose of government is to secure rights, and the legitimacy of its power is derived from popular consent. It's perfectly possible to have a monarchy (or even a theocracy) that secures those rights, and acts with the consent of the governed. Early America under the Constitution, in which only a few thousand per state actually held the franchise, fit this bill; as does modern Lichtenstein, in which the population recently voted to dramatically expand monarchical power.

The metric of our assessment of foreign regimes, then, should be that of the Declaration: do they secure the rights of the governed? Translating this into policy would indeed bring us into opposition to leaders with substantive internal support: Chavez and Putin come to mind. They may be popular, but they're also autocrats at best.

Jeremy Young: But we haven't gotten to the root of the matter yet, I don't think. More people can vote percentagewise under Chavez and Putin than could in early America, or for that matter in the loya jirga in Afghanistan. These leaders have popular consent in every sense of the word. Then you have individuals like King Abdullah of Jordan, who enjoys wide popular support and provides his people with virtually every right they could desire, except the right to vote. To me, Abdullah would also fall under the idea of democracy: if his people could vote, he'd be pretty likely to be elected.

In my view, the people's most sacred right is the right to choose whatever kind of government they want -- whether that means a left-wing regime like the Sandinistas or Chavez, a right-wing regime like Putin or (God forbid) Jorg Haider, or even a king like Abdullah. The only one of these leaders I think the U.S. should oppose is Putin, because he does not provide that most sacred right to a section of his people -- the Chechnyans. The rest, I think we should work with.

So I think the difference between us is that I feel the U.S. has no right to impose its view of government on other countries, while you feel the U.S. has a responsibility to advocate for a government that secures their rights. I don't think we differ significantly on popular legitimacy. Am I correct?

Josh Trevino: As an aside, and not that I'm an expert, I was surprised to find how many Jordanians were willing to disparage King Abdullah in private conversation. For what that's worth.

I dissent from your conception of "the people's most sacred right" on two counts: I believe rights are individually, not collectively, held; and the most sacred rights are therefore individual -- "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Now, I should admit that the Declaration appears to be of two minds on the topic, speaking first of men "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" in their capacity as men, not a collectivity -- and then, in the next paragraph, speaking of a "Right of the People" in a clearly collective sense. I interpret the latter as a shorthand for an aggregation of individual rights, as the posited endowment of the rights is explicitly individual; but I suppose there's room for disagreement there, especially given Thomas Jefferson's later idealization of "the people" at large.

All of this is to say that even if a government has popular legitimacy, "deriving [its] just powers from the consent of the governed," unless that government has as its purpose "to secure these [certain unalienable Rights]," we are not bound to respect it, except on grounds of plain pragmatism. So what we have here is a dual- criteria hierarchy for the moral evaluation of foreign regimes. I propose that the hierarchy, from best to worst, would look like this:

1) Popular legitimacy, securing rights -- e.g., UK, France, et al.
2) No popular legitimacy, securing rights -- e.g., Jordan, USA 2005-2006
3) Popular legitimacy, no securing rights -- e.g., Venezuela, Iran, Russia
4) No popular legitimacy, no securing rights -- e.g., Turkmenistan, Belarus

This places rights ahead of legitimacy, as it should be, I think, while acknowledging legitimacy's importance. Furthermore, as the given examples show, the gap between the second and third tiers is huge -- again illustrating the overriding importance of rights versus legitimacy. And, to return to the topic that started this exchange, I believe that Islamist regimes are almost always third-tier, with the AK party nearly alone in that milieu in having the possibility of being in the first tier.

Jeremy Young: Lots of good stuff here. First off, you don't have to worry that I'll hold Jefferson up against you; support for just about ANY idea can be found in Jefferson's writings someplace!

I'm not surprised about King Abdullah; there's a strong and growing Islamic nationalism building in that country, mainly from resident Palestinians but also from his own people who are tired of his collaboration with the West. It'll be interesting to see whether he's able to hold on to the reins of power without significantly changing his relationship with the United States.

We've identified another key difference between us, I think: I believe that rights derived collectively are more important, in most cases, than rights derived individually. That difference makes sense given that the authentic intellectual basis of Republicanism/conservatism is a libertarian impulse, while the authentic intellectual basis of Democratism/liberalism is a communitarian impulse (despite what "libertarian Democrat" Kos would have us believe, even if the Democatic Party becomes a temporary home for libertarians, their views will always be incompatible with liberalism/progressivism). As a self-described Crolian Progressive, I certainly fall toward the extreme of communitarianism.

Finally, regarding the hierarchy you propose, I would switch numbers 2 and 3 in value. That's why I see people like Chavez as less bad than someone like Putin. I would also be hesitant to say that the government of Iran has popular legitimacy -- I still think that if the U.S. hadn't made the catastrophic error of supporting Rafsanjani in the last election, someone more moderate would have been elected instead of Ahmadinejad.

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by Unknown | 10/28/2007 03:53:00 PM
Former ProgressiveHistorians blogger and political scientist Gene Keyes (esperanto41) has republished an excellent article on Finland's Winter War that he originally wrote in 1972. A portion of this article was published in Crossroads: An International Socio-Political Journal in 1985.

If you're going to be in Boston on November 19, stop by Faneuil Hall at 7 PM for a free reading of the letters of John and Abagail Adams by -- get this -- Governor and Mrs. Patrick and former Governor and Mrs. Dukakis. The event is sponsored by the Massachusetts Historical Society and Harvard University Press, which is releasing a new collection of the Adams letters.

If you're linking to us from your Daily Kos blogroll or anywhere else, please make sure you're using our full and correct URL: http://www.progressivehistorians.com. Since our move to Blogspot, formerly-active addresses http://progressivehistorians.com and http://www.progressivehistorians.com/frontpage.do no longer work. Thanks!

What's on your mind?

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by Bastoche | 10/28/2007 03:37:00 PM
In his essay, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” (which I briefly referenced in Part III of this series and to which I will return in more detail in future posts), Robert Kagan claims that we have entered an era in which “history”—that is, the contest between ideologies and between two ideologies in particular, liberalism and autocracy—is once again determining the foreign policy choices of the world’s nations. The most fundamental choice each nation must make is, of course, on which side of the ideological divide to stand: the liberal side with America, the European Union, Japan, Australia, and India or the autocratic side with Russia, China, and Iran.



But ideology is not the only motivating force in this new era of “history.” The world’s great nations, according to Kagan, are once again being motivated by “competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial.” Nations, that is, are ambitiously competing not just for material wealth and prosperity but for commodities more intangible: status, prestige, and honor.

Such nationalistic ambition, according to Kagan, “drives China’s foreign policy today.” Although this ambition is “tempered by prudence,” the Chinese are nonetheless “powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia.” They believe, just as Americans believe, that power “is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less.” Power, though, is not an end in itself but a means to an end, and that end cannot be measured solely in the material terms of economic wealth and military might. The Chinese understand, just as Great Powers have always understood, “that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation.”

That other autocratic giant, Russia, is also “moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect.” The Europeans too “seek honor and respect…but of a postmodern variety.” Europe’s ambition is no longer to stand on the world stage as a predominant military power, but rather “to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority…to be keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role.”

America, in this respect, is no different from China or Russia or Great Britain or any other powerful nation in human history. America too is ambitious for status and prestige and honor, and since America is by far the predominant military and economic power in the world, it quite naturally seeks to base its sense of national honor on its economic and military might.

But economic and military strength are not the only criteria that America uses to distinguish itself from other nations and claim for itself a place of special honor in the grand sweep of history. America seeks also the prestige that flows from a different kind of power and authority, the moral authority that the Europeans currently claim. For America, in Kagan’s view, is the nation that originated in freedom and whose destiny is to organize the world into one democratic polity of peace, thus bringing to its historical culmination the universal ideal out of which it was born.

1. The Two Ideals

America thus, in Kagan’s view of the world, gives its allegiance to two ideals of honor: the ideal of the warrior and the ideal of the moralist. America lives by the ideal of the warrior when it protects democracy from the aggression of tyranny and terror. It lives by the ideal of the moralist when it promotes democracy and actively disseminates it throughout the globe. America is uniquely fitted to live and act by both ideals because it is both militarily powerful and morally prudent. Though militarily powerful, America puts its power prudently at the service of the value out of which, as a nation, it was born—freedom—and does not use its colossal power in order to assert an autocratic and imperial agenda.

That America can live by both ideals and can shift prudently from one to the other is especially important in this era when the clash of ideologies, as Kagan puts it, is once again looming on the horizon. In the coming decades autocratic nations will be competing against one another and against liberal nations not only for resources but for status and influence, for prestige and honor. Such nations will not hesitate to employ the Hobbesian methods of deceit and force, against which the Kantian methods of reason and rules favored by the liberal nations will, predictably, prove useless. One nation, at least, while remaining devoted to reason must also so dedicate itself to military power that it can resist the attempts of the autocrats and terrorists to subvert democracy and eradicate freedom from the march of history.

One nation has indeed come forward to fight autocracy and terror and to establish freedom and democracy on a universal basis. That singular nation, the world’s “dangerous” nation, as Kagan calls it, stands at the apex of history not only as the preeminent military power but also as the preeminent moral power. That nation is, of course, America.

In Kagan’s neocon worldview, America is, simply put, history’s preeminent nation. America stands singular and alone as the embodiment of the ideal—freedom—to which history itself aspires. The Europeans may have, after centuries of violence and conflict, crafted a realm of reason and rules, but America originated as a nation of reason and rules. Further, though Europe sees itself as the embodiment of a new Kantian order, only America has the power to protect that order and to promote it throughout the globe.

In his book, Of Paradise and Power, Kagan makes the distinction between the Hobbesian world of anarchy, in which the terrorist and autocratic states of the world compete to gain power and preeminence, and the Kantian paradise of reason, in which the democratic states of Europe cooperate to maintain peace and prosperity. In Kagan’s scheme of things, America has taken on the role of the world’s Sheriff, protecting the nations that occupy the paradise of peace from those that occupy the wilderness of power. America can successfully assume this role because, on the one hand, it has the strength and will to deal effectively with the Hobbesian rogues and outlaws and, on the other, it is dedicated to reason and rules and the Kantian ideal of perpetual peace.

Kagan, however, though he refers often in his argument to Kant’s idea of perpetual peace, fundamentally misunderstands it. Kant understood that the exercise of true moral authority conforms to three imperatives: freedom, equality, and solidarity. The goal of the moral nation is not preeminence, the affirmation that one nation, above all others, is replete with power and therefore more worthy of dignity and respect than any other nation, but equality, the affirmation that every nation, irrespective of its economic and military might, is capable of autonomous self-legislation and therefore as worthy of dignity and respect as every other nation.

The ideal of the warrior, on the other hand, is based on preeminence, the acknowledged dominance of one individual or nation over all others. Only one nation can stand as the most powerful of its era, and in our era that nation is, of course, America. But, in Kagan’s view, there is more. Only one nation can boast that its military and economic might are unequaled not just now but in the entire span of human history. And, for Kagan, even that is not all. Only one nation will be able to look down from the very summit of human achievement—the organization of the world into one polity of freedom and peace—and claim that it has brought history to its culmination and close. At the end of history, when freedom overcomes terror and tyranny, peace and equality will prevail among all nations. But in that paradise of freedom and equality one nation will stand forever preeminent, the nation that will have produced, by means of its power, everlasting peace and that will, on the basis of its power, forever guarantee it: America.

As charming and seductive as Kagan’s worldview is, it radically distorts the relationship between the ideal of the warrior and the ideal of the moralist. Instead of the ideal of the moralist constraining that of the warrior, the ideal of the warrior has infected that of the moralist. Kagan’s concept of honor is a warrior’s concept of honor, and his concept of power is a warrior’s concept of power. Preeminence, domination, victory, and fame are the values that drive his worldview. As Kagan envisions it, America will ultimately stand forth not only as history’s preeminent military nation, the nation that achieved an unsurpassable apex of power, but also as history’s preeminent moral nation, the nation that brought to its final realization the ideal for which history was created: freedom.

The fatal flaw in Kagan’s worldview, in the neocon worldview generally, is that moral action and freedom do not derive from a dialectic of domination and submission, of preeminence and subservience, of power and weakness, but from a different sort of dialectic entirely, a dialectic, to use Kant’s terms, of reason and desire. Out of reason, pure practical reason, as Kant calls it, come the moral imperatives that constrain the desire to dominate and rule by means of military power: the imperatives of freedom and equality and solidarity. In the realm of practical power one nation might very well be superior to all other nations. But in the realm of practical reason, every nation is, finally, an autonomous agent of self-legislation and no more worthy of dignity and respect—of “honor”—than any other nation.

Kant upholds an ideal of human action and human agency that is rational, an ideal based on reason and leading to a struggle for equality. Kagan upholds an ideal of human action and human agency that is irrational, an ideal based on power and leading to a struggle for predominance. Kagan is committed to a view of America as the world’s predominant nation, the nation that, finally, will stand above all others in the grand narrative of history, and thus is committed not to a Kantian ideal of reason and rules but to a warrior ideal of power and preeminence—a warrior ideal of honor.

I’ll discuss in more detail Kant’s concept of perpetual peace next time, but first, with the help of Thomas Hobbes and William Shakespeare, I’ll illustrate the connection between the two attributes on which Kagan puts his main ideological emphasis: power and honor.

2. To Wear Without Corrival All Her Dignities

Harry Percy—or Hotspur, as he is better known—is annoyed (Henry IV, Part One: Act I, scene iii). He has done yeoman’s work for his King. Not only did he help Henry depose King Richard and usurp the throne, he has now helped him secure it by defeating in battle the Scottish rebel, Douglas. True, he at first refused to hand over to the King the prisoners he took from Douglas—an act of defiance that has nettled Henry. But now, come before Henry at Windsor, he agrees to do so—as long as Henry ransoms Hotspur’s brother-in-law, Mortimer, from the Welsh rebel Glendower. Henry bristles at the suggestion since Mortimer, it seems, has married Glendower’s daughter and turned rebel himself. Hotspur defends his brother-in-law, but Henry will have none of it and orders Hotspur to comply with his demand.

Henry exits, and Hotspur, incensed at being treated with such highhanded disdain, proceeds to exhibit the irascible temper that has earned him his nickname. To Hotspur it is clear that Henry, having ascended to the throne and to the title of King, has become so enamored of his power and preeminence that he treats with contempt even those who have put their lives and blood at his service. All must genuflect to his will or suffer the punitive swipe of his anger. But Hotspur has no intention of letting himself be relegated to a position of passive and abject subservience. Henry gained his preeminence through rebellion, did he? Hotspur will follow the precedent that Henry has set: he will become a rebel himself and expunge the dishonor with which Henry, in his arrogance, has sullied his name.

Listening to Hotspur’s tirade are his father Northumberland and his uncle Worcester. Hotspur shifts his annoyance to them and claims that now and in the future they will stand convicted of two shameful acts. First, they aided Henry in his deposition of Richard, “that sweet lovely rose,” as Hotspur now calls him. But that retrospective shame is mere prelude to the greater and prospective one. “And shall it in more shame be further spoken,/That you are fool’d, discarded, and shook off/By him for whom these shames ye underwent?” (177-79) Hotspur urges them not to remain the submissive recipients of Henry’s contempt and disfavor. “No, yet time serves wherein you may redeem/Your banish’d honors and restore yourselves/Into the good thoughts of the world again” (180-82).

Only one field exists on which they can cleanse themselves of the blot of shame that now disfigures their reputation and restore themselves to honor: the field of battle. By means of rebellion and war will they rescue what they have lost—their stature and prestige—and subject the one who insulted them, Henry, to the everlasting humiliation of defeat. Hotspur welcomes the contest: “Send danger from the east unto the west,/So honor cross it from the north to south,/And let them grapple” (195-97).

Indeed, Hotspur seems eager to stand at the precise juncture where danger and honor meet:

By heaven, methinks it were an easy leap,
To pluck bright honor from the pale-fac’d moon,
Or dive into the bottom of the deep,
Where fathom-line could never touch the ground,
And pluck up drowned honor by the locks,
So he that doth redeem her thence might wear
Without corrival all her dignities. (201-07)

Shakespeare here illustrates for us a central aspect of the warrior ideal of honor: the drive to stand preeminent and without rival in the world. In the scale of honor only one position is worthy of occupancy: the first position, the very summit of the scale. Any other position, from number two on down, signals a reduction of honor and of worth. And only one person can stand atop the scale. The supreme position is not meant for occupation by a crowd, and two constitutes a crowd. Anyone who pretends to climb atop and share that space with its occupant becomes a “corrival” and must either be pushed off or given sole right of occupancy. Equality is not a concept that exists in the warrior’s ideal of honor—equality at the top, that is. Below the top all are equal: equally secondary, equally diminished, equally unworthy of the fame and glory and prestige—of the honor—that accrues to the one at the summit of the heap.

Hotspur, though, wants to gain preeminence not just through any act but through an act commensurate with his own grandiose image of himself, an act akin to leaping at the moon or diving into the depths. In rebellion against his King he finds such an act. As a warrior, he knows that only one quality justifies occupancy of the realm’s supreme position: power. And as a warrior he also knows that there is only one arena in which he can most convincingly display his power: war. In that arena he has already more than once displayed his skill and courage and prowess as a warrior, in a word, his power. When, in that greatest of all competitive arenas, he next puts on display the spectacle of his power, he will defeat Henry and compel those who witness his triumph to give him his reward. And for Hotspur his reward is not just a tangible one, the throne of England, but something intangible and even more valuable: everlasting honor.

3. The Pleasure of Contemplating Their Own Power

Like Shakespeare, Hobbes also understood the connection between, on the one hand, a person’s display of power and, on the other, that which he receives as reward for such display: honor.

In Chapter X of Leviathan, “Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness,” Hobbes defines honor and dishonor as the subjective evaluations we place on a person, the degree, that is, to which we assign a person value or worth. “The manifestation of the value we set on one another is that which is commonly called honoring and dishonoring. To value a man at a high rate is to honor him; at a low rate is to dishonor him” (x, 17).

The rate at which we value a person, the degree, that is, to which we honor or dishonor a person, is dependent primarily on a single consideration: the amount of power that person is able to display. "Honorable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality is an argument and sign of power. And therefore to be honored, loved, or feared of many is honorable, as arguments of power. To be honored of few or none, dishonorable” (x, 37-8).

Numerous qualities can prompt us to evaluate a person’s worth at a high level. Such material attributes as wealth or privilege are indications of power and therefore honorable. “Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence” and similar character traits are honorable, “for they proceed from the conscience [consciousness] of power” (x, 40). Those glorious indices of martial success, “dominion and victory,” are also honorable “because acquired by power.” Conversely, “servitude, for need or fear, is dishonorable” (x, 39). Those who serve do so, of course, only because they are weak and without sufficient power to compel others to serve them and so are unworthy of high estimation and honor.

We might assume that conventional ideas of justice would influence our estimation of a person’s worth or value. They do not. “Nor does it alter the case of honor, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power) be just or unjust; for honor consisteth only in the opinion of power” (x, 48).

Hobbes does not approve of this drive for honor: in the state of nature, as he envisions it (see Part IV of this series), the desire for glory is one of the three principle causes of conflict. But Hobbes also understands that in the state of nature, in which there is no sovereign invested with the power to produce and maintain order, it makes good rational sense for an individual to accrue as much power as possible in order to compete successfully for resources and to protect what he gains.

Some individuals, though, are driven by an irrational motive in their pursuit of power, in that they “[take] pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires” (xiii, 4). Some individuals, that is, are driven to needless acts of war in order to display their power before the gaze of the world and to gain from such display—from their victory in combat—honor and all her dignities: prestige, fame, and glory. After they have thus distinguished themselves above all others, they will forever have the pleasure of contemplating their own power. To put it more exactly, they will forever have the pleasure of seeing reflected in the eyes of those they have subjected the image of their superiority.

It is just such a pleasure that Kagan and the neocons hope to enjoy. Kagan of course does not claim that America displays its military strength and warrior will for the sake of establishing itself at the apex of historical honor. His vision of American power is, on the surface, a prudent and practical one. The world outside Europe, as he describes it, is a world of Hobbesian anarchy, and America, as the protector of democracy and freedom, must be able to face down and defeat the autocrats and terrorists who occupy it. In the Hobbesian sector of the world it must, that is, abide by the warrior ideal of power and domination.

But for Kagan America is not only the warrior who valiantly protects the weak against terror and tyranny but also the savior who is born to bring freedom and perpetual peace to all the nations of the world. When Kagan speaks of America’s moral destiny, he seems to be shifting away from a warrior ideal to a moral ideal. But such is far from the case. Rather than relinquishing the warrior ideal for a higher moral ideal, Kagan sublimates the warrior ideal: America will once again put on display its singular greatness before the world, vanquishing its enemies (and pretenders like Europe) not only as a military power but as a moral power. Though America will earn honor in the arena of war, it will achieve its ultimate honor after it has eradicated the Hobbesian realm of anarchy and established Kantian peace on a worldwide basis. America will then stand forever as history’s preeminent nation.

But however much Kagan tries to sublimate his warrior ideal, it remains a warrior ideal, based on preeminence and power. No amount of gesturing towards the Kantian ideas of reason and peace (which he misunderstands) will transform his warrior ideal into something sublime. His ideal of America as history’s “dangerous” nation—dangerous because of its commitment to both freedom and power—remains embedded in and inseparable from his ideal of America as history’s supreme warrior nation.

Such sublimation of the warrior ideal also allows Kagan, and the neocons in general, to indulge in a neat bit of ideological shape-shifting. Given the resurgence of “history” and the looming conflict between liberalism and autocracy, there is little prospect that America will be able any time soon to establish a Kantian realm of worldwide peace. For the foreseeable future, America will have to live in a world of Hobbesian struggle and war, contending against those nations that seek to eradicate freedom and replace it with autocracy and terror. The neocon idealists, therefore, will have to forego their dream of establishing, under the aegis of American power, a worldwide empire of democracy and peace. They will have to settle for a lesser but still honorable spectacle: America, its only goal the preservation of freedom, displaying its predominant power in the glorious arena of war.

4. There is Honor and Then There is – Well, What Exactly?

In that glorious arena in which he confidently expected to win everlasting fame, Hotspur loses not only his life but something more valuable. On the field of Shrewsbury he meets not King Henry but Henry’s son, Prince Hal. In the single combat that follows, it is not the seasoned warrior, Hotspur, but the former delinquent, Hal, who emerges the victor. “O Harry, thou hast robb’d me of my youth,” Hotspur says as he is dying. “I better brook the loss of brittle life/Than those proud titles thou has won of me./They wound my thoughts worse than thy sword my flesh” (V.iv.77-80).

It is not the tangible wounds to his body but the intangible wounds to his honor that cause Hotspur grief and prompt his despair. Hal’s victory over him in battle—the glaring indication that Hotspur's power is less than that of his opponent—has dealt death not only to his body but to his reputation and his vaunting pride as a warrior. Even worse, because he has displayed in battle not strength but weakness, not power but impotence, Hotspur’s defeat has forever attached to his name the antithesis of honor: shame and humiliation.

There is, however, on the field of Shrewsbury one soldier who cares about neither honor nor humiliation. Prior to the battle Falstaff delivers a “catechism” on honor (V.i.127-41) in which he points out that honor has no power to set a leg or an arm or to “take away the grief of a wound.” If honor has no power to remedy physical hurt, what power does it have? None, really. It is but a “word” and has nothing in it but the incorporeal “air.” In battle a man might earn a title to this puff of breath, but if he dies while earning it, he’ll neither hear it applied to his name nor feel its effects. And even if he does live to enjoy its benefits, such enjoyment will be brief, for the envy of others will not long allow him to keep his title. “Therefore I’ll none of it,” Falstaff concludes, preferring a long and inglorious life without the empty title of honor to a short and glorious one with it.

Falstaff’s catechism is by no means Shakespeare’s final word on the relationship between power and honor. Shakespeare would express his mature view in the tragedies that follow the Henriad, especially King Lear and Antony and Cleopatra. But for our purposes, the individual to whom we must now turn in order to counter the neocon ideal of honor is the one to whom Kagan himself repeatedly refers: Immanuel Kant.

Crossposted at dailykos

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by Winter Rabbit | 10/28/2007 11:32:00 AM
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Source

"Brand new state, Brand new state, gonna treat you great!

Gonna give you barley, carrots and pertaters,

Pasture fer the cattle, Spinach and Termayters!

Flowers on the prairie where the June bugs zoom,

Plen'y of air and plen'y of room,

Plen'y of room to swing a rope!

Plen'y of heart and plen'y of hope!





Source

"The whole management of Indians has been abnormal . . . Everything is controlled by arbitrary laws and regulations, and not by moral, social, or economic principles."





All of the tribes experienced a Trail of Tears due to the forced relocations; some were more or less severe. However, regardless of their differing severity, the forced relocations were all part of the U.S. extermination policy, or genocide, to solve their "Indian Problem." The "problem" in Indian Territory was that the tribes who were forced to relocate under conditions that significantly reduced their population through extermination or starvation, some in harsh winter conditions, was that they survived the forced relocations at all. Hence, a "solution" was needed to insure white domination in Indian Territory. Henry Dawes and his Dawes Act fueled by racism, denial of joint statehood, and a cruel "wedding" fusing Indian Territory with the State of Oklahoma all contributed to Oklahoma's Statehood through the elimination of many tribal lands and the great diminishment or total elimination of tribal political influence.


The white supremist attitudes of Henry Dawes, author of the Dawes Act and which led to the Allotment Era, was paramount in shifting land ownership from whole tribes to the sole individual.



Kill the Indian, Save the Man

Massachusetts Senator Henry Dawes, convinced that the white man's ways were superior, pooh-poohed the idea of communal property, although he did express sympathy for the Natives. "The common field is the seat of barbarism, while the separate farm is the door to civilization," he said. Dawes explained that selfishness was the root of advanced civilization, and he could not understand why the Indians were not motivated to possess and achieve more than their neighbors.



The white supremist attitudes of Dawes was reflected in whites prior to the Allotment Era that Dawes formally initiated.




The Indians Are

Getting Uppity


Berthrong describes the attitudes of the whites who overwhelmed the Cheyenne and Arapahoe reservation subsequent to allotment:

White-Indian relations after the opening of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation were tragic. Deep prejudice often bordering on racism marked whites' attitudes toward their Indian neighbors...If the Indians had possessed more economic potential, skills, and incentives to acquire additional or replacement property, the losses they suffered through fraud and theft would not have been so severe or irremediable. As it was, the discrimination, the loss of property, and the contempt in which the Indian was held by farmers and ranchers made it impossible for many of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes to follow the 'white man's road.' (Berthrong, p.207)

Guy Dull Knife Jr. recalls his boyhood impression of whites outside the reservation borders: "He remembered the dirty looks, the waiting for whites to enter first, the standing in line, others cutting in front of them, the occasional cursing, clerks tailing him up and down the aisles and the signs that said 'No Dogs or Indians Allowed'." (Starita, p.326)



Dawes's anti Indian sentiment bled over into the legislation he created, the notorious Dawes Act. The facts that it authorized the president, Roosevelt at the time, to twist tribal land ownership into individual land ownership if the land was deemed "advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes" when Oklahoma's primary assets were farming and agriculture prior to its statehood, were by no means innocent and coincidental. To the contrary, it was divide and conquer in retrospect. 

Divide -

(Underline mine)



Source

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in all cases where any tribe or band of Indians has been, or shall hereafter be, located upon any reservation created for their use, either by treaty stipulation or by virtue of an act of Congress or executive order setting apart the same for their use, the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized, whenever in his opinion any reservation or any part thereof of such Indians is advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes, to cause said reservation, or any part thereof, to be surveyed, or resurveyed if necessary, and to allot the lands in said reservation in severalty to any Indian located thereon in quantities as follows:





Source

In addition, the law severely reduced Indian holdings; after all individual allocations had been made, the extensive lands remaining were declared surplus and opened for sale to non-Indians. In 1887, the tribes had owned about 138 million acres; by 1900 the total acreage in Indian hands had fallen to 78 million.



- and conquer.


As Oklahoma sought statehood the U.S. government again divided reservation lands to sell to white settlers, leaving just a small parcel for reservation land.



The Merriam Report: A Look At "Real" Life

The report found many contributing factors, one of the major ones being the Allotment Policy.  In the Merriam Report, it was also said that

Not accompanied by adequate instruction in the use of property, it has largely failed in the accomplishment of what was expected of it.  It has resulted in much loss of land and an enormous increase in the details of administration without a compensating advance in the economic ability of the Indians...it almost seeded as if the government assumed that some magic in individual ownership of property would in itself prove an educational civilizing factor, but unfortunately this policy had for the most part operated in the opposite direction.  Individual ownership in many instances permitted Indians to sell their allotment and to live for a time on the unearned income resulting from the sale.(2)





100 Years in the Land of the Red Man

"When the Allotment Era came into being, it changed every perspective we had on land--it went from the control of the tribe to the control of the individual," he explained.

Those individuals, Jones recounted, were illegally taxed and many lost their land by their failure to pay those taxes, largely because their grasp of the new and foreign concept of individual private land ownership didn't quite match the speed of the government's enforcement of its imposed tax policy.


Continuing, as the Iroquois Confederacy helped to shape American Democracy on a national level, the Sequoyah Constitution helped to shape the Oklahoma Constitution on a state level.



Source

No historian can properly review the provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution without considering the Sequoyah Convention which convened at Muskogee in 1905; for some of the most important provisions of the Constitution derived their inspiration from the Sequoyah Constitution, notably: Article nine on Corporations, the method of Legislative apportionment, the Great Seal, less than a unanimous verdict of Jurors in trials of civil causes, compulsory teaching of Agriculture and Domestic Arts in the public schools, the names of many Counties in old Indian Territory, et cetera.

As Vice-President of the Sequoyah Convention of 1905 and as President of the Guthrie Constitutional Convention of 1906, I witnessed some facts of historical value, hitherto not given publication.

-huge snip -

"You know many people in Oklahoma Territory and I wish you would remember this, 'The politicians of Oklahoma City and Guthrie will try to dominate the convention and shut out the Indian Territory along with western Oklahoma. When statehood comes, remember to keep "tab" on the delegates elected and for some good man over there, not allied with the machine, for president of the Convention'." To which I agreed.



But that wasn't part of the "solution," Roosevelt squelched Indian Territory's attempts at having joint statehood with Oklahoma. As the result, there is no Centennial for Indian Territory.




ENABLING ACT (1906)

After the introduction of a bill for admitting Indian Territory as the State of Sequoyah sank in Congress in December 1905-January 1906, Pres. Theodore Roosevelt recommended joint statehood.


What was part of the "solution" was a cruel "wedding" between Indian Territory and the State of Oklahoma simultaneously with Oklahoma's admittance into statehood.



Source

Rev. Dodson:

Representing the Indian Territory is Mrs. Anna Bennett of Muskogee. 

(Durant presents Mrs. Bennett to Jones, bows, and steps back.)


Mrs. Bennett:

I will.  And to you I present my hand and my fortunes, convinced that  your love is genuine and sincere.


Dodson:

Do you, Mr. Oklahoma Territory, take this woman to be your lawfully  wedded wife, to have and to hold, from this day forth, in union as the  State of Oklahoma?
 



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To bring this to a close, all of the tribes experienced a Trail of Tears due to the forced relocations; some were more or less severe. However, the tears did not end with the forced relocations. The cruel mock wedding ceremony caused tears; being shut out of the democratic process caused more tears after the denial of duel joint statehood, as did the Dawes Act and all the racism that accompanied it. Simultaneously, the Indian Boarding Schools were working their "solution," which would continue until approximately 1970, while the forced sterilizations would work their "solution" and end in the mid 1970's. No Indian, no "problem" for the whites who cut the Indians out of life, democracy, or both.

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by Gordon Taylor | 10/27/2007 10:58:00 PM

This photograph was taken by Kurdish guerrillas of the HPG, the armed force of the PKK, which has been fighting against the government of Turkey since 1984. I doubt that anyone knows exactly where this picture was taken; anyone, that is, except the guerrillas who took it. I found this photo recently--this and the others which follow--deep in the website of the HPG.

Readers should remember this about Anatolia, the land mass now occupied by the Republic of Turkey: it is a heap of ruins, a treasure house of history, a place whose secrets archaeologists have scarcely begun to uncover. Only in the last ten years, for example, have archaeologists uncovered artifacts in the town of Hakkari, capital of the province of the same name, which belong to a people that the scientists cannot yet identify. Probably they are ancestors of the Kurds who have always lived there. Clearly there is more to the story of the people and civilizations of these mountains than has been discovered so far. And that's why the photograph above is potentially of such interest, especially to the Kurds.



These pictures represent, I believe, a new phenomenon in this high tech age: rebels, outlaws, guerrillas (officially "terrorists" to the Turkish govt., which forbids calling them anything else) hiding out in some of the remotest, least explored mountains on earth, carrying digital cameras in their pockets and using them to document the wonders of the world they inhabit. And one of those wonders is this tunnel.

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Who built it, and when? Why did they go to all the trouble to cut through solid rock and gain access to this remote canyon? (By the way, we know that it's remote--very remote--because otherwise the PKK guerrillas wouldn't be there.) I am no expert on this area--probably situated in the mountains of Bohtan: Cudi Dagh (pron. Judi Daah) and Gabar Dagh, near the town of Sirnak--but I have read a substantial amount of the travel literature, and I know of no Western traveler who has explored this area and published pictures like these. Freya Stark did pass this way (on a mule) in the 1950s, but she took a route further north, close to the present-day motor road that runs west from Hakkari to Sirnak and Cizre, on the Tigris. In the 19th century Gertrude Bell explored the south slopes of Judi Dagh looking for the shrine and tomb of Noah (also, as we will see, photographed by the PKK), but she didn't penetrate the mountains themselves. And in 1843 Asahel Grant, M.D., of Utica and Waterville, New York, rode into the western, more settled side, to meet Bedr Khan Bey, the Kurdish emir of Bohtan and progenitor of the Bedirhan clan who have been so prominent in modern Kurdish history.

There was, however, one group of Westerners which passed directly through the very heart of these same mountains. Their passage was hardly a secret and certainly not easy. They were the Ten Thousand Greeks, stranded mercenaries trying to make their way home from the Battle of Cunaxa, near Babylon, in 401 B.C. Their journey is described in the Anabasis of Xenophon.

When they first encountered the villages of the mountain people, the Greeks left them untouched, in hopes that the natives would let them pass unhindered. Their hopes were disappointed. In the seven days it took them to traverse the mountains of the Karduchoi, generally thought to be the antecedents of the Kurds, the Greeks suffered more than in all the battles they had previously fought. The Karduchoi were everywhere, rolling great rocks down upon them, harassing their rear and flanks, shooting at them with bows six feet long and powerful enough to pierce armor with their arrows. It was, as Xenophon describes it, a hell on earth, complete with thunderstorms, rain, and snow: a famous episode in a justifiably famous book. Up to now I'm not aware that anyone has published evidence of the Karduchoi and their society. With these photographs I believe that the guerrillas of the PKK have done just that.

Judging from the order of the photos, the tunnel above appears to lead to this:

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It's a cave, obviously, and a spring of some kind, with water emerging from a spigot hewn from the rock. Notice also the stone work. Obviously this is old, but is it ancient enough to be the work of the Karduchoi? The next images show these:

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Which is a detail of this:

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The figure on the left of the stele is a PKK fighter with his weapon. Included in this series are the following images carved from stone:

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More detail of the dagger on the grave stele. Note that it's virtually the same style of ritual dagger worn by modern Kurd and Arab tribesmen. Also, animals. A snake:

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Dogs, and judging by their curved tails, possibly Salukis:

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Ducks?

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A mounted king:

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This should provide enough excitement for anyone, especially those who get seduced by Indiana Jones movies. But Kurdish nationalists, I would think, might especially want to take note. If I'm wrong, and these artifacts have already been thoroughly catalogued by archaeologists, then I will gladly retreat into obscurity. But I think this is fascinating stuff. And the only people who really know about it are the PKK guerrillas.


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by Winter Rabbit | 10/27/2007 02:18:00 PM

NOT VANISHED, JUST OVER-LOOKED

"Viewing Native Americans as a people of the past is the most accessible, convenient perception for Americans. While I believe it is important to create images that are historically, culturally correct and support the preservation of culture, I also believe it is imperative that a modern, contemporary representation of Native culture needs to surface in the mainstream.


A web of land theft in

http://indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id="1096415997

a new kind of Indian war is taking place. Non Indians' racism and genocide denial, who engage in attempting to steal tribal sovereignty through the court system, ignore an obvious question. Where would they meet to practice their religion, a white Caucasian word, if their churches were stolen, condemned, and being used to drill for oil and uranium? The "spirit" seems to be this: "What one group calls genocide, another group may call progress." Let's try to get an overview of the "progress" in the web of land theft in the "New kind of Indian war."


August 26th through the 29th was the SYMPOSIUM ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS CLAIMS (a good overview is here).

I am speculating, but I think that one reason for the Symposium on the Settlement of Indian Reserved Water Rights Claims was because of this:




Red Shirt Village -- Residents of Red Shirt village on the northwest corner of the Pine Ridge Reservation have put up signs warning people of the high nuclear radiation levels found in the Cheyenne River.


Which, I assume in part resulted in this resolution being made.


Defenders of the Black Hills: a group of volunteers without racial or tribal boundaries working to ensure that the United States government upholds the Fort Laramie Treaties of 1851 and 1868.

NOW, THEREFORE BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,
the GPTCA affirms that any person, agency or entity including federal, state, and county governments, or corporations, businesses or companies who shall cause any nuclear pollution, or contamination to enter the confines of the Indian Reservation Homelands should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, and

NOW, BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED,
the Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association calls upon all other Tribes and Indian Nations to join with us to protect our Reservation Homelands, to ensure that no damage will come to the people, the culture, the environment including the air and water and economy of the Tribes of the Great Plains because of uranium mining or other processing of contaminants in the region of the Great Plains Region.


Furthermore, I assume that this was created to combat the devastating affects of land theft and pollution in the above case, at the very least:

The Tribal Supreme Court Project is part of the Tribal Sovereignty Protection Initiative and is staffed by the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) and the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI). The Project was formed in 2001 in response to a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases that negatively affected tribal sovereignty.

This information at the international level, beginning with the Cobo Report, is crucial to understand in conjunction with all the above.


Chapter 6: International developments in the recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples

The Cobo report, as it is commonly known, was prepared over the next decade. It was submitted to the Sub-Commission in 24 instalments between 1981 and 1984 with its conclusions and final recommendations compiled in a consolidated volume in 1987. Underpinning the report's detailed conclusions and recommendations is the recognition that, despite the great diversity of their cultures and systems, Indigenous peoples throughout the world have common experiences of discrimination, oppression and exploitation.

- snip -

- recognition that Indigenous peoples and nations are subjects of international law and must be included within international law processes;

- recognition of Indigenous peoples' special relationship to land and its integral link to their beliefs, customs, traditions and cultures and for efforts to be taken to maintain or restore that relationship;

- the ratification and implementation by States of international human rights treaties such as those on genocide, anti-slavery, racial discrimination, civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights; and

- the establishment of a working group on Indigenous peoples at the United Nations under the Sub-Commission.[12]

The chairperson altered this, yet some were still against it (emphasis & underline mine).


SPEAKERS CALL FOR INCREASED INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS,

Recognizing that most of the world's remaining natural resources -- minerals, freshwater, potential energy sources and more -- are found within indigenous peoples' territories, the sixth annual session of the Permanent Forum has brought indigenous groups together with representatives of Governments, intergovernmental organizations and United Nations agencies to state their views, voice concerns and suggest solutions regarding their lands, territories and natural resources.


We know how that went, don't we?

It falied in the U.S.

Here is more information about it.


Since we're talking about a web of land theft and

http://indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id="1096415997

"a new kind of Indian war, I'm going to make this ending short and sweet about something more well known. I don't agree with the Chief of the Cherokee Nation in regards to the freedman, but I really don't agree with Diane Watson. Let me say why by posing a question which I believe reveals Watson's intent in light of the fact that her "proposal" has so much support, while vital issues as Indian Health Care have failed. My question is based completely upon my own speculation.

Who gets the casinos after the Cherokee lose the right to use them?
Maybe it will be the Cheyenne State of Oklahoma and the U.S. Government. Should the world end their entire relationship with the U.S. based solely on the current sitting president? Right, please sign the pledge below.



Click on: Take A Stand! Click Here!

We "will accept nothing less than the U.S. government keeping the promises made to Native Americans."




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by Unknown | 10/25/2007 01:42:00 AM
If you're going to be at the AHA in Washington, DC, January 3-6, 2008, and want to hang out with some Progressive Historians, please send me an e-mail.

If your "name" is Ahistoricality, Bastoche, James Livingston, elle, Kevin Levin, Jeremy Young, Rob MacDougall, or strandsofpearl, I either already know you'll be there or am assuming you will. Therefore, if you're on this list and don't want to hang out with some Progressive Historians, please send me an e-mail asking me to take you off.

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by Unknown | 10/24/2007 08:03:00 PM
Since I'm now a formerly-pseudonymous blogger, I figured I might as well post this here. I'm on the organizing committee for this conference, which is primarily aimed at graduate students (but I'm not involved in paper selection, so plying me with large amounts of cash in order to get your paper accepted will only make you poor). If you decide to come up to Bloomington, let me know you heard about it at ProgressiveHistorians and I'll buy you a drink when you get here.

If you're interested in digital history, we're also interested in having a panel on that subject with regard to history and the public sphere (hint, hint).

Full CfP is over the fold. Submission deadline is December 1, 2007.


Call for Papers
The Paul Lucas Conference in History at Indiana University
“Public Spheres of History: Writing the Past and Representing the Profession”
Hosted by Indiana University History Graduate Student Association
Friday and Saturday, February 29 and March 1, 2008



Keynote Speaker: Michael Adas, Abraham E. Voorhees Professor of History

Rutgers University, New Brunswick

Saturday, March 1, Time: TBA



This year's conference explores the different spheres that historians study, while also emphasizing the multitude of publics in which history is crafted. Expanding on Jürgen Habermas's original definition of the "public sphere" as a category of analysis, historians increasingly highlight the valuable flexibility of the concept. Embracing this trend, our conference will investigate the different political, social, and cultural spheres studied and inhabited by historians. Conference participants might address wide-ranging subjects and traverse broad thematic, geographic and temporal boundaries, but some questions we hope to address include:



*What is the relationship between the private sphere and political or other larger publics?

*How does the political sphere affect or impinge on the individual? How is the personal of public significance and how does the individual affect or participate in a larger public?

*Does the changing scale of studying history affect ideas about the public? Can we speak of a transnational or global public?

*How do new technology and media impact and transform the way publics are created?

*How is history created or represented within a variety of public settings (museums, for instance), levels of education, or in the wider community?



Submissions of pre-organized panels are strongly encouraged. Individual paper submissions are also welcome and those selected will be assigned by the conference committee to a suitable panel. The panels will include three paper presentations that are each twenty minutes in length. Presentations will be followed by a brief commentary offered by a discussant. Please submit the items and information below no later than Saturday, 1 December 2007. The HGSA Conference Committee will evaluate proposals and inform participants by Saturday, 15 December 2007.



Submission Instructions:

1. names of all authors for panels (also note name of person presenting paper)

2. institutional affiliation and title/position

3. contact information: email address, postal address, telephone/fax numbers

4. title and an abstract of the paper, which is no more than 250 words - requests for any audio-visual equipment (overhead, projector, PowerPoint, etc.) must be cited in the abstract



If you would like to serve as a commentator, please submit a CV and a brief statement detailing your areas of expertise.

While the panels and keynote address will be take place on Saturday, 1 March 2008, participants are encouraged to attend organized events on Friday, 29 February 2008. These will include an additional lecture given by Michael Adas organized by the American Studies Department, a dissertation workshop for advanced IU graduate students, and a conference welcome reception held on Friday evening. This information will be provided to participants.



Submit this information *via email* as an attachment (.doc or .pdf formats preferred) to:

hgsaconf@indiana.edu, or submit a hard copy to:



The Paul Lucas Conference in History
History Department Indiana University
742 Ballantine Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-7103
Fax: 812-855-3378


The conference is *free* to IU graduate students in any field. Non-IU students will submit a registration fee of $30 (checks payable to HGSA)

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by Gordon Taylor | 10/24/2007 02:02:00 AM

It's time to get some things straight. Logic is misleading us into illusion.

I, like so many others, have said that Turkey would be foolish in the extreme to send troops into northern Iraq. Their attempts to chase out the PKK guerrillas would lead to chaos. An Iraqi Kurdish population, united in its hostility, knowing that Turkish tanks were really aimed at Kirkuk (and they would be), would fight them for every inch. Nothing that they could do would have any long-term effect on the viability of the PKK, who would scatter, vanish, re-group, and then scatter again. It would be an act of madness: a hammer swung hard upon a globule of mercury.

Remember this, however: just because it's madness doesn't mean the Turks won't do it.



We've already dodged one bullet in 2003. When the Turkish Parliament denied Bush the right to send troops across southern Turkey to invade Iraq from the north, they did W. a big favor and dealt away a huge bargaining chip: the right to send their own troops in with them. With the Turks in northern Iraq in 2003, there is no telling what might have occurred. The US Army may very well have found itself caught in the middle of Saddam's army, the Kurdish peshmergas, and the Turks themselves, all engaged in one huge festival of carnage. For the fact is, the Kurds of northern Iraq would never have allowed the Turks to enter. It would have been bloody.

It's the same way now, but even worse. The Kurds are anything but pushovers. Many units of the Iraqi Army, for example, are really Kurds--the best units, in fact. Does anyone really think that these troops will stay in Baquba or Baghdad when they hear that the Turks have pushed south from the Khabur River? They don't give a damn about the central government of Iraq; they'd go north immediately for the really important fight.

Cuneyt Elsever, writing in the Turkish Daily News of 19 June 2007, summarized a Turkish government report that had just come out (13 June) on the situation in northern Iraq. He writes:

Cross-border operations became a method that Turkey often applied in the 1990s, but it is hard to tell if they were successful in general...So far, the number of major Turkish cross-border operations in the region amounts to 24. In practice, the Turkish military [has been] inside Iraqi borders since 1992. Especially in the rectangular area of Zaho, Haftanin, Duhok and Amediye, there is a heavy Turkish military presence. Turkish troops from time to time hold operations from a few kilometers to 60 kilometers deep inside the border.

In other words, the Turks have been deep into Iraq many times, with little lasting effect. Note the name of Amediye (Amadiyah), which is the eastern end of the rectangle. Amediye is close to the Greater Zab River, a major mountain tributary of the Tigris. Beyond the Zab, the ground rises into chaos: a mountain wilderness of high peaks and gorges, with no roads. Obviously, a move toward the PKK "headquarters" on Kandil Mt. would be extremely difficult:

The number of outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists in northern Iraq varies between 3,000 and 5,000. Number of active PKK terrorists along the border is estimated around 2,000, 1,000 of whom are relatively better trained. The number of terrorists inside Turkey is estimated as 1,500.

After 2003 in particular, over 10 relatively large-scale armed PKK camps were formed in northern Iraq. The total number of camps is estimated at over 20. Weapons and ideological training are also provided here.

The PKK sheltered heavily in the Kandil mountain range away from the Turkish border. The closest point of these mountains is 80-90 kilometers by air, more than 100 kilometers surface distance. Considering terror camps, the distance exceeds 150 kilometers. The nearest airborne support is provided from Diyarbakır or Malatya. Which means that air support is about 456 kilometers away from the operation region. It is very difficult to lay siege on the mountain range entirely. Such an attempt requires a siege varying between 235 kilometers and 317 kilometers at distance, an area over 3,000 kilometer square meters that should be kept under control.

The valley PKK has nested in is at the height of 1,300-1,500 meters. Mountains around the valley are about 2,900 meter high. The summit peak is at 3,500 meters. [In other words], the PKK is in a way placed in a natural fortress. The dimension of this area is estimated as 13.4 X 4.6 kilometers. Zigzag passages should be taken to reach the mountain.

Presumably, the number of terrorists around the Kandil Mountain and surroundings decreased [after] discussions [of] a possible cross-border operation. However, a few hundred terrorists are deployed in well-maintained shelters in the mountain. Some experts believe this figure is about 600. The Mountain is mostly used for training purposes. Newcomers are brought here and trained for bombings and attacks. The “Mahsun Korkmaz Military Academy” and the “Haki Karer Ideological Training Academy” are situated here on the mountain.

In other words, this is a tough one. Any rational government would have negotiated long ago with these people, especially as the PKK has declared several unilateral cease-fires and indicated a desire to stop fighting. The men who run the Turkish Army, however, are not big on rationality. They are nationalists. Nothing will move them. Why, you may ask, doesn't the elected government of Turkey just go ahead and negotiate with the PKK? Because in Turkey the civilians pretend to rule, and the army pretends to let them. And the Army will not budge.

At least one Turkish newspaper columnist, Orhan Kemal Cengiz, writing in the Turkish Daily News, understands quite well what is going on. He begins his column of 20 October 2007 (before the most recent clash in Oramar) by saying, quite frankly, that he doesn't know if he can say what he wants to say without going to jail. Specifically he cites the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, the catch-all provision that the authorities use any time someone says something that they aren't supposed to. This article, which forbids the utterance of anything which threatens the "indivisible unity of the Turkish State," makes John Adams's Alien and Sedition Acts look easy by comparison. You can't say, for example, that the Army doesn't know what it is doing with the PKK. That threatens the...blah blah blah. So Orhan Kemal Cengiz is worried.

But that basically is what Cengiz is saying. Strategy, he says, should be based on reality. But Turkey's "strategists" live in a fantasy world:
When it comes to our “strategists” though, we see a bunch of people whose understanding of what is going on is heavily distorted by their mindset. They are nationalists, they see things through emotionally clouded lenses, their assessment of Turkey's role and power is fundamentally wrong (because they do not understand that Turkey's power comes from its being a bridge, being a democracy, from its potential to become an EU member, and its being an ally of the West and so forth) and they take it for granted, not considering that this power may increase and decrease according to the steps that Turkey takes. Their understanding of the root causes of some problems, like the Kurdish question, is far from reality.


Right on, Orhan Kemal Bey. I thank you and wish you luck. Equally skeptical, but far more pessimistic, is another TDN columnist, Cengiz Candar. Candar thinks that we have passed the point of no return. The public had been enraged by previous attacks, he notes, but Sunday's attack has in his opinion made a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq inevitable. The army, he says, will try to do what Israel did in Lebanon: create a buffer zone of approximately 40 km. in depth into Iraq. And like Israel, he thinks that the effort will come to no good. But it will be done.

This is bad news, not only for George W. Bush, but for anyone who wants a better world. I happen to agree with Cengiz Candar. I think we are looking at dark times ahead.

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